I shall start this chapter\(^1\) with an analysis of the basic social relation of any pedagogic practice. In this analysis I shall distinguish between pedagogic practice as a cultural relay and pedagogic practice in terms of what that practice relays – in other words, pedagogic practice as a social form and as a specific content. I shall argue that the inner logic of pedagogic practice as a cultural relay is provided by a set of three rules, and the nature of these rules acts selectively on the content of any pedagogic practice. If these rules constitute what can be called the ‘how’ of any practice, then any particular ‘how’ created by any one set of rules acts selectively on the ‘what’ of the practice, the form of its content. The form of the content in turn acts selectively on those who can successfully acquire. I shall examine in some detail the social class assumptions and consequences of forms of pedagogic practice.

On the basis of the fundamental rules of any pedagogic practice I shall generate:

1. What are regarded as opposing modalities of pedagogic practice, usually referred to as conservative or traditional and progressive or child-centred.
2. What are regarded as oppositions within what is considered the same basic form. Here the opposition is between a pedagogic practice dependent upon the market place for its orientation and legitimation, a practice emphasizing the assumed relevance of vocational skills, and a pedagogic practice independent of the market place, claiming for itself an orientation and legitimation derived from the supposed autonomy of knowledge. It will be argued that the pedagogic practices of the new vocationalism and those of the old autonomy of knowledge represent a conflict between different elitist ideologies, one based on the class hierarchy of the market and the other based on the hierarchy of knowledge and its class supports.

The basic argument will be that whether we are considering the opposition between conservative and progressive or the opposition between market and knowledge-oriented pedagogic practice, present class inequalities are likely to be reproduced.

I shall start first with some thoughts about the inner logic of any pedagogic practice. A pedagogic practice can be understood as a relay, a cultural relay: a uniquely human device for both the reproduction and the production of culture. As I have said earlier, I shall distinguish between what is relayed, the contents, and how the contents are relayed. That is, between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of any transmission. When I refer to the inner logic of a pedagogic practice I am referring to a set of rules which are prior to the content to be relayed (Figure 3).
The relationship basic to cultural reproduction or transformation is essentially the pedagogic relation, and the pedagogic relation consists of transmitters and acquirers. I shall examine the internal logic of this relationship. In fact, I consider the fundamental logic of any pedagogic relation.

I have drawn a distinction here between what I call the fundamental logic of the practice and the various practices to which this logic can give rise. This is rather similar to language, itself: a finite set of rules which can generate a great number of other rule systems. I will examine some of the realizations of these practices and I will analyse the social class assumptions of these practices.

If we look at the relationship between transmitters and acquirers I shall assert that this is essentially, and intrinsically, an asymmetrical relation. There may be various strategies for disguising, masking, hiding the asymmetry. For example, in certain modalities of practice the acquirer is perceived as a transmitter, and, perhaps, the transmitter appears to be the acquirer, but these are essentially arabesques. This may seem a very cynical view but we shall see whether it is of any value. Now it is the case that although this relation is intrinsically asymmetrical the realization of the asymmetry may be very complex.

The rules of pedagogic practice as cultural relay

I shall propose that the essential logic of any pedagogic relation consists of the relationship essentially between three rules. And of these three rules, the first is the dominant one. I would now like to outline concretely the three rules.
Hierarchical rule

In any pedagogic relationship the transmitter has to learn to be a transmitter and the acquirer has to learn to be an acquirer. When you go to the doctor you have to learn how to be a patient. It is no good going to the doctor and saying, ‘I feel really bad today, everything is really grey.’ He says, ‘Don’t waste my time,’ because he has many patients. ‘Where is the pain? How long have you had it? What kind of pain is it? Is it acute? Is it chronic? Is it sharp? Is it persistent?’ After a bit you learn how to talk to your doctor. He teaches you to be an acquirer. But how he teaches you is the function of a much more general set of forces which we shall go on to discover.

The acquirer, then, has to learn to be an acquirer and the transmitter has to learn to be a transmitter. The process of learning how to be a transmitter entails the acquiring of rules of social order, character, and manner which became the condition for appropriate conduct in the pedagogic relation. It is these rules which are a prerequisite of any enduring pedagogic relation. In any one such relation the rules of conduct may to different degrees permit a space for negotiation. These rules of conduct will here be called hierarchical rules which establish the conditions for order, character, and manner.

Sequencing rules

Now if there is a transmission it cannot always happen at once. Something must come before and something must come after. If something comes before and after, there is a progression. If there is a progression, there must be sequencing rules. Every pedagogic practice must have sequencing rules, and these sequencing rules will imply pacing rules. Pacing is the rate of expected acquisition of the sequencing rules, that is, how much you have to learn in a given amount of time. Essentially, pacing is the time allowed for achieving the sequencing rules.

Criterial rules

Finally there are criteria which the acquirer is expected to take over and to apply to his/her own practices and those of others. The criteria enable the acquirer to understand what counts as a legitimate or illegitimate communication, social relation, or position.

The internal logic of any pedagogic relation consists of hierarchical rules, sequential/pacing rules, criterial rules. We can distinguish, at another level, two more general rules. The hierarchical rules will be called the regulative rules and the other rules of sequence/pace criteria will be called instructional or discursive rules. The fundamental rule is the regulative one. Later on we shall see why this is the case. Briefly, all education is intrinsically a moral activity which articulates the dominant ideology(ies) of dominant group(s). On the basis of these rules, I want to generate, to begin with, two different kinds of practices, and I shall do so on the basis of an examination of these rules.

In any teaching relation, the essence of the relation is to evaluate the competence of the acquirer. What you are evaluating is whether the criteria that have been made available to the acquirer have been achieved – whether they are regulative criteria about conduct, character, and manner, or instructional, discursive criteria: how to solve this problem or that problem, or produce an acceptable piece of writing or speech.
On the basis of the above rules of regulative and discursive order I shall distinguish between two generic types or modalities of pedagogic practice. I must emphasize that these are types, and each can give rise to a range of practices, some of which will be discussed later in this chapter.

**Generating modalities of pedagogic practice**

**Hierarchical rules**

If we take, first of all, the hierarchical rules, these rules can be explicit but they can also be implicit. If they are explicit, then the power relations in the relationship are very clear. The relationship is one of explicit subordination and superordination. This creates an explicit hierarchy. But a hierarchy need not necessarily be explicit. A hierarchy can be implicit. Let me give an example.

In 1968 the French took to the streets and the English studied a government report (Plowden, 1967) on primary education. The report was called *Children and their Primary Schools* – not ‘Children and Primary Schools’ or ‘Primary Schools and Children’. In this book there were thirty-six pictures. If you look at those thirty-six photographs, there are children playing creatively by themselves: individual, productive play. There are pictures of children playing in groups, there are children in the school corridors and in the gardens surrounding the school, but it is difficult to find a teacher. This is the context created by an implicit hierarchy. The more implicit the hierarchy, the more difficult it is to distinguish the transmitter. We can define an implicit hierarchy as a relationship where power is masked or hidden by devices of communication. In the case of an implicit hierarchy the teacher acts directly on the context of acquisition but indirectly on the acquirer. Thus hierarchy can be either explicit or implicit.

**Sequencing rules**

These rules can be explicit. If they are explicit, then it means that children of 5 years of age are expected to develop particular competences, to behave in a particular way, and at 6 years of age they are expected to have different competences. Explicit rules regulate the development of the child, usually in terms of age. This means that the child is always aware of what her/his expected state of consciousness is supposed to be. He or she may not like it, but it is clear. Explicit sequencing rules construct the temporal project of the child. They construct temporal dislocations. These sequencing rules may be inscribed in syllabuses, in curricula, in behavioural rules, in rules of punishment and reward, and are often marked by transition rituals. However, sequencing rules can be implicit. Where sequencing rules are implicit the child initially can never be aware of his or her temporal project. Only the transmitter is aware of the temporal project of the child. We have a difference here. In the case of explicit sequencing rules, the child has some awareness of its temporal project; in the case of implicit sequencing rules only the teacher or the transmitter can be so aware.

We have to ask ourselves what is the basis of such a relationship, because if the child is not aware of his or her temporal project, then the child lives only in the present. When the sequencing rules are explicit, the child has some awareness of her/his temporal project although he or she lives in the past. The grammatical tenses of these pedagogic practices are opposed to each other. One child lives in the past although he or she can see his/her future, whereas the other child lives in the present of its own doings. Sequencing rules reveal what may be called the ideology of tense.
How does this come about? If sequencing rules are implicit, then they will be drawn from a range of theories. The theories that I am going to put forward here are not the only ones, but others will be structurally similar where they apply to children. The theories are set out in Figure 4. They construct a pedagogic *bricolage*.

If we look at these theories we can see that although they are very different they have certain things in common. First, almost all the theories, with the exception of Gestalt, is a developmental theory. What is acquired has a meaning only in relation to a particular stage. (In the case of Freud there is the development from polymorphous perverse, the nirvana of babyhood, followed by oral, anal, phallic, and genital.) With one exception, all these theories are stage theories. Second, in every one of these theories the child is active in his or her own acquisition. Third, in all these theories the acquisition of the child cannot be readily modified by explicit public regulation, as learning is a tacit, invisible act. Fourth, in every one of these theories the child’s institutional and cultural biography is excluded. The theories are asocio-logical. At most the child has a family. Fifth, in every one of these theories, except the ethological, the relationship between the transmitter and the acquirer or the parent and the child is such that the socializer is potentially if not actually dangerous. These theories tend to be critical of the transmitter as an imposer of meaning. Every one of the theories, except the ethological, replaces domination by facilitation, imposition by accommodation.

The theories imply an implicit hierarchy. Now if you are going to apply this *bricolage* to the classroom as a teacher, or as a social worker, or as a counsellor, you have to have what is called a theory of reading. For in these theories the child is transformed into a text which only the transmitter can read. In other words, the teacher, the social worker, the psychotherapist is looking for certain signs, but the signs have meaning only to the teacher, and the child can never be aware of the meaning of its own signs, as their reading requires complex theories.

I was once in a classroom where a child was by himself. I happened to say that the child looked very unhappy, and the teacher said, ‘Don’t worry about that. He is just working through a problem.’ The teacher, then, can read the child, and the teacher’s behaviour to that child will depend on this reading, which in turn depends upon theories and upon how they have been transmitted, that is, recontextualized.

Sequencing rules can be implicit or explicit. Where rules are implicit the acquirer initially can never know the meaning of her/his sign, as the meaning is derived from complex theories and their recontextualizing, and so available only to the transmitter.
Criteria can be explicit and specific. For example, in a school the child may be making some facsimile of a person, drawing a person, and the teacher comes along, looks at the drawing and says (it does not have to be repressive; explicit criteria do not have to be repressively realized), ‘That’s a lovely man, but he’s only got three fingers,’ or ‘That’s a very good house, but where is the chimney?’ In other words, the pedagogy works by making available to the child what is missing in the product. Now if it works in this way, by showing what is missing in the product, the criteria will always be explicit and specific, and the child will be aware of the criteria. He or she may not like them, but they will be articulated. However, criteria can be implicit, multiple, and diffuse. Imagine we go to another classroom. The children have very big pieces of paper. A whole series of media are available through which their unique consciousness can be graphically realized. And the facilitator happens to glance at the image and says to the child, ‘Tell me about it.’ ‘Oh, that’s very exciting.’

In the case of implicit criteria, by definition, the child is not aware except in a very general way of the criteria she/he has to meet. It is as if this pedagogic practice creates a space in which the acquirer can create his/her text under conditions of apparently minimum external constraint and in a context and social relationship which appears highly supportive of the ‘spontaneous’ text the acquirer offers (Daniels, 1989).

We can now say that we have distinguished between pedagogic practices in terms of those which have explicit hierarchical rules, explicit sequencing/pacing rules, and explicit criteria and those with implicit hierarchical sequencing/pacing and criterial rules.4

Types of pedagogic practice: visible and invisible

I shall now define two generic types of pedagogic practice, as follows. If the rules of regulative and discursive order are explicit (hierarchy/sequence/pace) criteria, I shall call such a type a visible pedagogic practice (VP) and if the rules of regulative and discursive order are implicit I shall call such a type an invisible pedagogic practice (IP).

Visible pedagogies

A visible pedagogy (and there are many modalities) will always place the emphasis on the performance of the child, upon the text the child is creating and the extent to which that text is meeting the criteria. Thus acquirers will be graded according to the extent that they meet the criteria. A visible pedagogy puts the emphasis on the external product of the child.

Visible pedagogies and their modalities will act to produce differences between children: they are necessarily stratifying practices of transmission, a learning consequence for both transmitters and acquirers. It is here worth adding that because a visible pedagogy has explicit rules of regulative and discursive order it does not mean that there are no tacit rules or messages, only that their meaning must be understood in the context of a visible pedagogy.

Invisible pedagogies

In the case of an invisible pedagogy the discursive rules (the rules of order of instruction) are known only to the transmitter, and in this sense a pedagogic practice of
this type is (at least initially) invisible to the acquirer, essentially because the acquirer appears to fill the pedagogic space rather than the transmitter. The concrete present of the acquirer is manifest rather than the abstract/abstracted past of the controlling discourse.

Invisible pedagogies are less concerned to produce explicit stratifying differences between acquirers because they are apparently less interested in matching the acquirer’s text against an external common standard. Their focus is not upon a ‘gradable’ performance of the acquirer but upon procedures internal to the acquirer (cognitive, linguistic, affective, motivational) as a consequence of which a text is created and experienced. These procedures of acquisition are considered to be shared by all acquirers, although their realization in texts will create differences between acquirers.

But these differences do not signal differences in potential, as all acquirers are judged to share common procedures. Differences revealed by an invisible pedagogy are not to be used as a basis for comparison between acquirers, for differences reveal uniqueness. Thus whereas visible pedagogies focus upon an external gradable text, invisible pedagogies focus upon the procedures/competences which all acquirers bring to the pedagogic context. Invisible pedagogies are concerned to arrange that context to enable shared competences to develop realizations appropriate to the acquirer. Thus, in the case of invisible pedagogies, external non-comparable differences are produced by internal commonalities – that is, shared competences – whereas in the case of visible pedagogies external comparable differences are produced by internal differences in potential. In short, invisible pedagogies emphasize acquisition – competence and visible pedagogies transmission – performance.5

These differences in emphasis between visible and invisible pedagogies will clearly affect both the selection and the organization of what is to be acquired, that is, the recontextualizing principle adopted to create and systematize the contents to be acquired and the context in which it is acquired.

Different theories of instruction inhere in these two pedagogic types, which we illustrate in Figure 5 and, at the same time, show how modalities of the two types can be regarded as liberal, conservative, and radical practices.

In Figure 5 the vertical dimension refers to the object of change of the pedagogic practice. Thus the primary object may be to produce changes in the individual or the primary object may be to produce changes not in the individual but between social groups. The horizontal dimension refers to the focus of the pedagogic practice, which can be either upon the acquirer or upon the transmitter. Clearly the latter indicates a visible and the former an invisible pedagogy. If we take the top left-hand quadrant, intra-individual–acquisition, then this would indicate what is often regarded as ‘progressive’ pedagogic practice whose theories of instruction are likely to be drawn from those listed earlier. However, if we take the bottom left-hand quadrant, acquisition–intergroup, the primary object of this pedagogic practice is to produce changes between social groups, that is, how he acquirer comes to understand the relation between social groups and through this new appreciation change his/her practice. This would be a radical rather than a liberal–progressive practice, e.g. Freire and, through Freire, the pedagogy of liberation theology. It would also include neo-Marxist formulations such as those of Giroux (1989).

The top right-hand quadrant, intra-individual–transmission, is likely to select behaviourist or neo-behaviourist theories of instruction which, relative to those selected in the top left-hand quadrant, are often regarded as conservative. It is a matter of interest that this top right-hand quadrant is regarded as conservative but has often
produced very innovative and radical acquirers. The bottom right-hand quadrant shows a radical realization of an apparently conservative pedagogic practice.

So far, then, we can see that these generic types can take either progressive, conservative, or radical modalities, and that theories of instruction will act selectively upon both the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of any pedagogic practice. Further, these different theories will act selectively upon ‘what attributes of the acquirer become candidates for what labels. Finally, each theory will carry its own conditions of contestation, ‘resistance’, subversion.

I have proposed that it is important to distinguish between the fundamental grammar or ordering principles of a pedagogic practice and the forms of realization as pedagogic types. The ordering principles I have analysed as regulative (hierarchical) and instructional (selection, sequence/pace, and criteria). On the basis of this grammar I have generated two generic forms of pedagogic practice according to whether the ordering principles are explicit or implicit. These basic forms were shown to yield progressive, conservative, and radical modalities.

The next section will concentrate upon the social class assumptions of the generic types visible/invisible in their non-radical forms. We shall consider after this analysis two modalities of visible pedagogies, an autonomous modality and a market-oriented modality.

Social class assumptions of pedagogic practice

The fundamental proposition is that the same distribution of power may be reproduced by apparently opposing modalities of control. There is not a one-to-one relation between a given distribution of power and the modality of control through which it is relayed. In terms of this chapter, pedagogic practices are cultural relays of the distribution of power. Although visible and invisible pedagogies are apparently
opposing types, it will be shown that both carry social class assumptions. However, these social class assumptions vary with the pedagogic type. The class assumptions of visible pedagogies are different from the class assumptions of invisible pedagogies. These class assumptions carry consequences for those children who are able to exploit the possibilities of the pedagogic practices. The assumptions of a visible pedagogy are more likely to be met by that fraction of the middle class whose employment has a direct relation to the economic field (production, distribution, and the circulation of capital). Whereas the assumptions of an invisible pedagogy are more likely to be met by that fraction of the middle class who have a direct relation not to the economic field but to the field of symbolic control and who work in specialized agencies of symbolic control usually located in the public sector. . . . For both these fractions education is a crucial means of cultural and economic reproduction, although perhaps less so for that fraction directly related to the economic field.

Social class assumptions of visible pedagogies

Sequencing rules

I shall start by looking at the sequencing rules of a visible pedagogy. In the case of a visible pedagogy the sequencing rules are explicit and mark the future of the child in very clear steps or stages. At 5 you should know and be this, at 6 you should know and be that, and at 7 you should know and be something else. Now it is quite clear that if a child comes to school at 5 and cannot meet the initial requirements of the sequencing rules, it will have difficulty in meeting the requirements at 6. Gradually the child will fall further and further behind. Three strategies may be applied in this situation, or later in the life of the acquirer. Either a repair system will have to be introduced to cope with the children who have failed to meet sequencing requirements or the pacing rules will have to be relaxed so that the child is given more time to meet the requirements of the sequencing rules. Either strategy results in a stratification of acquirers. In the case of a repair system the stratification is explicit and public; in the case of relaxation of the pacing the stratification is implicit, and perhaps will not become explicit and public until later in the pedagogic life. A third strategy would be to maintain the pacing and sequencing rules but to reduce either the quantity or the quality of the contents to be acquired or both. All three strategies produce a more delicate system of stratification within an already stratifying pedagogic practice.

Early reading is crucial to a visible pedagogy and is an early requirement of the sequencing rules. Psychologists tell us that at a given age a child should be able to read. I am not certain I wholly accept this. The age by which a child should be able to read is a function of the sequencing rules of the pedagogic practice of the school. In the case of a visible pedagogy it is crucial that a child reads early, and this for many reasons.

Once a child can read, the book is there, and the book is the textbook or its equivalent. Once a child can read, independent solitary work is possible. He/she is also gradually introduced into a non-oral form of discourse, the rules of which are often at variance with oral forms. It is not only that reading involves the acquisition of a new symbolic relay but that what is relayed is itself different from the content of oral forms. Further, school reading is in many cases different from non-school reading. The difference is in what is relayed. In an important sense reading makes the child eventually less dependent upon the teacher and gives the acquirer access to alternative perspectives. Thus those children who are unable to meet
sequencing rules as they apply to reading become more dependent upon the teacher and upon oral forms of discourse.

There is another aspect of sequencing rules which we should consider: the relation between the local, the here and now, the context-dependent, and the less local, the more distant, the more context-independent meanings. In pedagogic terms this refers to the acquisition of context-tied operations, on the one hand, and on the other to operations and understanding of principles and their application to new situations. In visible pedagogies there is usually a time interval between these different levels of discourse, in the sense that the local, context-dependent, context-tied operations come in the early stage of the pedagogic practice and the understanding and application of principles come at a later stage; the understanding of the principles of the principles even later. Visible pedagogies entail a distribution of expected age-related discourses.

However, if children cannot meet the requirements of the sequencing rules and are caught up in the strategies of the repair system, then these children, often the children of the lower working class (including other disadvantaged ethnic groups), are constrained by the local, context-dependent, context-tied skills; by a world of facticity. Children who can meet the requirements of the sequencing rules will eventually have access to the principles of their own discourse. These children are more likely to be middle class and are more likely to come to understand that the heart of discourse is not order but disorder, not coherence but incoherence, not clarity but ambiguity, and that the heart of discourse is the possibility of new realities.

We might ask ourselves, if this is the possibility of pedagogic discourse, why are the children of the dominant classes not demonstrating the possibilities of the discourses they have acquired? And the answer must be that socialization into a visible pedagogy tries, though not always successfully, to ensure that its discourse is safe rather than dangerous. In this way a visible pedagogy produces deformation of the children/students of both the dominant and the dominated social classes. In summary we can say that a visible pedagogy is likely to distribute different forms of consciousness according to the social class origin of acquirers. These different forms evolve from the sequencing rules.

**Pacing rules: economy of pedagogic discourse**

Pacing refers to the expected rate of acquisition, that is, the rate at which learning is expected to occur. Pacing is thus linked to sequencing rules and here refers to the rate at which the progression established by those rules is to be transmitted and acquired. Pacing rules, then, regulate the rhythm of the transmission, and this rhythm may vary in speed. Figure 6 illustrates pacing and sites of acquisition.

I shall propose that the schools’ academic curriculum, if it is to be effectively acquired, always requires two sites of acquisition, the school and the home. Curricula cannot be acquired wholly by time spent at school. This is because the pacing of the acquisition is such that time at school must be supplemented by official pedagogic time at home, and the home must provide a pedagogic context and control of the pupil to remain in that context. There must be an official pedagogic discipline in the home. How does the school reproduce itself in the home? As the pupil gets older he/she is expected to do more and more school work in the home, and the family will be expected to ensure that the pupil has time at home for this work and will also have effective control over the peer-group practices of the child. The work the pupil is expected to do at home is, of course, homework. The basis of homework is usually a textbook. But the textbook requires a context, an official pedagogic
context in the home. That is, a space – a silent space – and this is not usually available in the homes of the poor. Nor is pedagogic time available for poor children, as often time is used to work for money – the curriculum practice of the street. Under these conditions there cannot be an effective second site of acquisition with an effective official pedagogic context and support. Without a second site, acquisition will not be possible, still less so as the child grows older. Failure becomes the expectation and the reality.

Where the catchment area of a school draws upon a lower working-class community it is likely, as we have seen, that the school will adopt strategies, or have strategies forced upon it, which will affect both the content and the pacing of the transmission. The content is likely to stress operations, local skills rather than the exploration of principles and general skills, and the pacing is likely to be weakened (Domingos, 1987). In this way children’s consciousness is differentially and invidiously regulated according to their social class origin and their families’ official pedagogic practice.

In the case of a socially mixed catchment area where pupils are drawn from a variety of class backgrounds some schools, through a variety of strategies of stratification (sometimes including repetition), will stream (or ‘set’) pupils according to the school’s estimate of their ability, and these different streams or sets will follow curricula varying in their content and/or pacing.

However, there is a more fundamental effect of strong pacing rules which affects the deep sociolinguistic rules of classroom communicative competence. With strong pacing, time is at a premium, and this regulates examples, illustrations, narratives which facilitate acquisition: regulates what questions may be put, and how many; regulates what counts as an explanation, both its length and its form. Further, strong pacing will tend to reduce pupils’ speech and privilege teachers’ talk, and this the pupils come to prefer, as time is scarce for the official pedagogic message. In this way the deep structure of pedagogic communication is itself affected. Pacing creates the rhythm of the communication, and rhythms of communication have different modalities. The rhythm of narrative is different from the rhythm of analysis. A strong
pacing rule for the latter constructs a principle of communication very different from the inner structure of the communicative principle children use in everyday life. The dominant modality of human communication is not that of analysis but that of narrative. We tell each other stories. However, some families not only construct an official pedagogic context but also socialize their children into official pedagogic communication and the inner structure generated by its pacing rules: an inner structure which points towards analysis rather than narrative, non-linear rather than linear communicative competences. In this way the pacing rule not only affects the social relations of communication but regulates the inner logic of communication.

The strong pacing rule of the academic curriculum of the school creates the necessity of two sites of acquisition. It creates a particular form/modality of communication which does not privilege everyday narrative. In this structure children of the disadvantaged classes are doubly disadvantaged. There is no second site of acquisition and their orientation to language, narrative, is not privileged by the pedagogic communication of the school, either in form or in content, for only some narratives are permissible in school. Thus the pacing rule of the transmission acts selectively on those who can acquire the school’s dominant pedagogic code, and this is a social class principle of selection. To weaken the pacing rule would require a change in the allocation of cultural capital and economic capital to the school. A change in cultural capital, because a weakened pacing rule sets up different classroom practice and communications which will require a change in the training of teachers and an increase in economic capital, because the transmission of the same information will now cost more. It is likely, however, that the costs of yearly repetition in some societies will most certainly be reduced, together with the costs of alienated youth. Currently the visible pedagogy of the school is cheap to transmit because it is subsidized by the middle-class family and paid for by the alienation and failure of children of the disadvantaged classes and groups.

We can now see that the pacing rule carries invisible social class assumptions which act selectively on those who can acquire the dominant pedagogic code of the school through the distributive consequences of the visible pedagogy’s strong pacing and its regulation of the deep structure of sociolinguistic competences. Indeed, where pacing is strong we may find a lexical pedagogic code where one-word answers, or short sentences, relaying individual facts/skills/operations may be typical of the school class of marginal/low working-class pupils, whereas a syntactic pedagogic code relaying relationships, processes, connections may be more typical of the school class of middle-class children, although even here pupil participation may be reduced.7

We can regard pacing rules as regulating the economy of the transmission and so these rules become the meeting point of the material, discursive, and social base of the transmission.

It is important to point out that a visible pedagogy is not intrinsically a relay for the reproduction of differential school achievement among children from different social classes. It is certainly possible to create a visible pedagogy which would weaken the relation between social class and educational achievement. This may well require a supportive pre-school structure, a relaxing of the framing on pacing and sequencing rules, and a weakening of the framing regulating the flow of communication between the school classroom and the community(ies) the school draws upon. Such relaxation of the framing of a visible pedagogy raises the cost of the transmission and has crucial implications for teacher training and school management. An invisible pedagogy, as we shall see later, is likely to create a pedagogic code intrinsically more difficult, initially at least, for disadvantaged social groups (from the perspective of formal education) to read and to control.
I have discussed the social class assumptions of visible pedagogies only in respect to sequencing rule and pacing. The discussion of the social class assumptions of hierarchical rules will be deferred for purposes of exposition until the discussion of the social class assumptions of invisible pedagogies. I must point out that what has been analysed is the implicit ideological basis of the pedagogic relay itself, that is, the bias in the relay which acts selectively upon those who can acquire what is relayed. Clearly what is relayed, the instructional contents, the values these presuppose, and the standards of conduct, character, and manner which form the contents of the school’s regulative discourse, carry cultural biases, including those of social class. These biases, the biases of what is relayed, are not the object of this analysis, as they are well documented in the literature.

Social class assumptions of an invisible pedagogy

The class assumptions of an invisible pedagogy translate into cultural and economic prerequisites for the effective understanding and acquisition of this practice. I shall examine those assumptions with respect to the concept of space, the concept of time, and the concept of control. In the case of space and time I shall distinguish between economic and symbolic assumptions.

Space

Economic The material costs of the space of an invisible pedagogy relative to a visible pedagogy is high. For an invisible pedagogy presupposes movement on the part of the child – indeed, considerable freedom of movement. In a school class organized for a visible pedagogy the amount of space per child would be the size of the table or, later, a desk and chair. Under these conditions the school class can hold, and often does, a large number of acquirers. However, if the same space were to be organized for an invisible pedagogy most of the tables or desks would have to be removed to allow each child freedom of movement. But now it would not be possible to put the same number of children in the same space. The number would have to be reduced if the invisible pedagogy were to realize its potential. This reduction in the number of children necessarily increases the cost of the space. When the spatial requirement is translated into family space it is clear that the family cannot employ an invisible pedagogy where there are many members confined to a small space, as is the case with many working-class and lower working-class families, including, especially, disadvantaged families of minority ethnic groups. The spatial requirement is much more likely to be satisfied in the case of middle-class families.

Symbolic The rules whereby space is constructed, marked, and ordered contain implicit cognitive and social messages. In the case of a family operating with a visible pedagogy each room has its own function; within rooms objects may well have fixed positions, spaces may be reserved for special categories of person. There are strong explicit rules regulating the movement of objects, practices, communication from one space to another. Such space is strongly classified and pollution is necessarily visible. However, such strong classification can often provide privacy within its specialized boundaries. In general, this organization of space is predicated on a user rule: ‘Leave the space as you find it’. Such a spatial grid carries cognitive and social messages. However, in the case of a family operating an invisible pedagogy the spatial grid is very different. Relative to a visible pedagogy space it is more weakly marked. The rules regulating movements of objects, persons, practices, communications are less
constraining. Meals may be provided on a cafeteria system. Living is more open-plan. Paradoxically, with greater freedom there is less privacy. If a visible pedagogy spatial grid is based on the fundamental rule that ‘Things must be kept apart’, with the rule of use ‘Leave the space as you find it’, then the spatial grid of an invisible pedagogy is based on the rule ‘Things must be brought together’, with the rule of use ‘Make your own mark’. That is, the spatial grid of the invisible pedagogy facilitates, encourages individual representations in the sense of showing, revealing, individual representations. Cognitive and social messages are carried by such a space, and such is unlikely to be available and constructed by families disadvantaged by class or ethnicity.

**Time**

**Economic** If all children left school at 14 there would be no invisible pedagogies. An invisible pedagogy presupposes a long pedagogic life. Its relaxed rhythm, its less specialized acquisitions, its system of control (see later) entail a different temporal projection relative to a visible pedagogy for comparable acquisition. Indeed, this fact is explicitly taken into account by many middle-class families who favour this regime in the early years of their child’s life before switching to a visible pedagogy at the secondary stage. Such favouring families often run a compensatory pedagogic programme dedicated to reading, writing, and counting whilst the child’s creative potential may be facilitated by the invisible pedagogy of the infant school or preschool.

**Symbolic** A child socialized by a familial visible pedagogy is involved in a particular symbolic projection in which time is punctuated by a series of dislocations in her/his treatment and expected behaviour. Time is symbolically marked as the child progresses through a series of statuses which define her/his relation not only to parents but also to the other siblings. The implicit theory of instruction held by parents which regulates their practice constructs age-specific communications/acquisitions. The child is developed in, and by, a particular construction of time.

However, in the case of an invisible pedagogy, the child is developed by, and is constructed in, a differently specialized construction of time. The child is constructed by implicitly held theories of instruction derived from the theories discussed earlier. This construction of time appears to give priority to the child’s time/space, rather than to the time/space of the parents; to the concrete present of the child, and age statuses give way to the unique signs of the child’s own constructed development. In this sense the structuring of the child’s time is through a different temporal grid. Visible and invisible pedagogies construct different concepts of the child’s development in time which may or may not be consonant with the concept of development held by the school.

There are some implications of a visible pedagogy which I shall develop here. Where the child moves through a series of specialized statuses in time, his/her conduct, achievement, or aspiration is relative to a particular status and the child is subject to normative criteria. He/she is not measured against himself/herself but only against those sharing a similar temporal category. From this point of view the child competes only with those in a similar temporal category. In this way competition is reduced, for jealousies, envious feelings, operates towards his/her peers. This is not to say that the child does not direct negative feelings towards other than his/her peers, but that he/she is aware, or can be made aware of, a distributive rule which privileges older children; a rule which is not personal but public.
In the case of an invisible pedagogy, because statuses are relatively more weakly marked, because of the more individualized or, better, personalized realizations expected, the child, by apparently competing only with her/himself, competes with everybody. This may well be the charm of criteria referencing. Parents relate to the child in terms of the child’s apparently unique showings and representations. Here the child, despite the apparent democracy of the pedagogic regime, is placed in a more competitive relation, as comparisons are less likely to be age-graded. Thus jealousies, envious feelings, aspirations are likely to be less specifically focused and so more difficult for both the parents and the child to deal with. From a cognitive and from a social point of view girls are less likely to be negatively constrained by invisible pedagogies than visible pedagogies. Conversely, for boys, under an invisible pedagogy practice, girls become successful competitors and a threat.

Control: hierarchical rules

Here I am concerned with how parents introduce and maintain principles of conduct, character, and manner – that is, concepts of social order, relation, and identity; in other words, with their regulative practice. In the case of a visible pedagogy the rules of social order are generally explicit and specific. The spatial and temporal grids provide an explicit structure, a grammar of proscriptions and prescriptions, and deviance is very visible. Once the child has acquired the implicit grammar of the spatial and temporal grids the problems of control are relatively reduced. Clearly, they do not evaporate. If the child disobeys, then privileges are withdrawn and explicit rules are articulated. In the extreme, strategies of exclusion and physical punishment may be used. I would like it to be clear that visible pedagogies are not necessarily ‘authoritarian’ but they are certainly positional. Control functions to clarify, maintain, repair boundaries. However, in the case of invisible pedagogies we can ask, where does the control lie in a context of weakened spatial and temporal grids, of encouraged personalized representations, especially in a context where we could reasonably expect a greater potential for issues of control to arise?

I want to propose that in this apparently relaxed familial context control lies almost entirely in inter-personal communication: a form of communication which works round the areas of motivation and intentionality as read by the parents. The communication is multi-layered. In order to facilitate this multi-layering of communication a progressive weakening takes place of the classification between the inside of the child and the outside. The parents encourage the child to make more of his/her inside public and facilitate the process. More of the child’s feelings, fantasies, fears, and aspirations are expected to be made public. The surveillance of the child is total. In this sense it is difficult for the child to hide and also difficult for the parents to. The communication process works to make the invisible visible, through language, and this may carry its own pathology.

In the case of a visible pedagogy we said that one of the strategies of control is exclusion but that this strategy carries difficulties in the case of an invisible pedagogy. For if the child is excluded (or as a strategy of self-defence excludes him/herself by withdrawing), then the communication process is weakened and so is the means of control. This gives the child a powerful strategy for controlling the parents by withdrawing, by excluding him/herself, by not being there, symbolically or physically. The parents must then develop strategies of retrieval in order to return the child symbolically or physically to the communication system. In this way the child acquires a particular elaborated variant of communication which gives rise to an elaborate repertoire of manipulative skills.
Invisible pedagogies give rise to procedures of control based upon multi-layered class patterns of communication necessary to support and promote their concept and practice of social order. And the construction of these communicative competences is likely to be class-based. Where these competences are not made available in the family the child is less likely to be self-regulating in school, according to the requirements of its invisible pedagogy practice, and is likely to misread both the practice and its pedagogic context.

I have argued that the assumptions of invisible pedagogies as they inform spatial, temporal, and control grids are less likely to be met in class or ethnically disadvantaged groups, and as a consequence the child here is likely to misread the cultural and cognitive significance of such a classroom practice, and the teacher is likely to misread the cultural and cognitive significance of the child.

We have focused upon different pedagogic sites in our analysis of the social class assumptions of visible pedagogies and invisible pedagogies in their generic form. In the case of visible pedagogies we focused upon the school and in the case of invisible pedagogies we focused upon the family. This is because the surface features of a visible pedagogy can be understood by all, as it is a standard pedagogic form, whether or not its underlying principles and practices are reproduced in the family. Thus it was necessary to analyse the underlying ordering principles of the official – that is, the school’s – pedagogic practice in order to show that the ordering principles may militate against the acquisition of this practice by class or ethnically disadvantaged groups. In the case of invisible pedagogies we focused on the family to show the supporting domestic pedagogic practice required if the classroom context and practice were to be understood for their pedagogic significance.

What we find, as I have pointed out before, is rarely a pure form of an invisible pedagogy but rather an embedded pedagogic practice where the invisible pedagogy is embedded in a visible pedagogy:

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Here — indicates embedded. The specific specialized skills and attributes of a visible pedagogy are beneath the surface of an invisible pedagogy, or surface at special occasions. And this holds in the family. What is of interest is when the strong classification of a visible pedagogy emerges as a pedagogic form in itself or surfaces to interrupt an invisible pedagogy. It is clear that, even for ardent sponsors of invisible pedagogies, this practice is generally confined to the child’s early years; certainly by the secondary level the demand is for a visible pedagogy, as it is this practice which leads to professional occupational placement. Given this situation, the socialization of a fraction of the middle class is perhaps unique as a modal type. We mean by modal that the form of socialization is not confined to individual families but is a publicly recognized form: a form in which the primary pedagogic socialization principles and practices are at variance with those of the secondary stage. Or where weak classification is embedded in a latent strong classification; and this, we suspect, has many complex consequences.

Whilst it is certainly not true to say that a visible pedagogy is a capitalist practice, it is the standard European pedagogic practice, in one form or another, of every elite secondary curriculum, whether in the East or the West. The strong classification of the visible pedagogy probably has its roots in the medieval university, in the major classification between the Trivium and the Quadrivium and in their subclassifications, and the subordination of both to religion. The strong classification
between mental and manual practice probably dates from the same period, when manual practice had its own specialized relays, either within the family or in specialized guilds, so creating the concept of the autonomous or abstract visible pedagogy. Such a visible pedagogy, autonomous with respect to control over its own practices, won its independence from the Church, but remained abstract in the sense that its discourse referred only to itself rather than to work. After gaining independence of the Church it became progressively regulated by the State. Whilst, in origin, the visible pedagogy as a relay is not itself a class product, even though what it relayed was, its institutionalization in either the private or the public sector led to a selective class-based acquisition.

In the case of the invisible pedagogy, certainly in the UK and probably elsewhere, the sponsors of this as a public form, its dissemination and construction as a practice, were members of that fraction of the middle class discussed earlier. Celia Jenkins (1989) has clearly shown that the members of the New Education Fellowship who were highly influential throughout the 1920s and 1930s in promoting and constructing the ‘new education’ were drawn almost entirely from professional agents of symbolic control functioning in specialized agencies of symbolic control. Those who opposed invisible pedagogies (other than pedagogues) were likely to be those members of the middle class whose work had a direct relation to the production, distribution, and circulation of capital.

The opposition between these fractions of the middle class is an opposition not over the distribution of power but over principles of social control. At economic and political levels the opposition is an opposition over the role of the State. On the whole the middle-class sponsors of invisible pedagogy support State intervention and the expansion of agents and agencies of symbolic control, and thus growth in public expenditure. For this is the ground and opportunity of their own reproduction and advancement, whereas the middle-class sponsors of visible pedagogy drawn from the economic sector and the entrepreneurial professions are opposed to growth in public expenditure. Thus there are opposing material and symbolic (discursive) interests.

We have so far discussed the class assumptions which act selectively on those who can achieve in visible and invisible pedagogies as generic types. We have earlier said that these generic types can generate a variety of modalities. We shall now consider two modalities of the visible pedagogy, modalities which are opposed to each other and which today are likely to be found in opposition in Europe and North and South America.

### Autonomous and market-oriented visible pedagogies

School systems and university systems are now more and more engaged in a struggle over what should be transmitted, over the autonomy of transmission, over the conditions of service of those who transmit, and over the procedures of evaluation of acquirers.

I shall conclude by looking, somewhat cursorily, at the present conflict between knowledge and market-oriented forms, that is, between ‘autonomous’ and ‘dependent’ forms of visible pedagogies. That is, between visible pedagogies justified by the intrinsic possibilities of knowledge itself and visible pedagogies justified by their market relevance. In a sense the autonomous visible pedagogy is both a sacred and a profane form, depending essentially upon one’s position as either transmitter or acquirer. From an acquirer’s point of view an autonomous visible pedagogy is instrumental to class placement through symbolic means. Yet it has the cover of the sacred. However, a market-oriented visible pedagogy is a truly secular form born out of the ‘context of cost-efficient education’, allegedly promoting relevant skills, attitudes, and
technology in an era of large-scale chronic youth unemployment. The explicit rules of selection, sequence, pace, and criteria of a visible pedagogy readily translate into performance indicators of schools’ staff and pupils, and a behaviourist theory of instruction readily realizes programmes, manuals, and packaged instruction. Specialization of curricula within a dominant market-oriented visible pedagogy allows for an almost perfect reproduction of the hierarchy of the economy within the school, or between schools (as in the case of ‘magnet’ schools), through the grading of curricula, e.g. managerial/administrative/business, through the various technological specializations, clerical, and imaginary trade apprenticeships for the lower working and marginal class groups. It is but a small step to encourage industry-based training and, as in Chile, State-sponsored privatized schools. Both autonomous and market-oriented visible pedagogies are relays of the stratification of knowledge, of social inequalities. However, the ideological base of the market-oriented visible pedagogy is more complex and, if I may be allowed, perhaps more sinister.

The autonomous visible pedagogy justifies itself by the intrinsic worthwhileness and value of the knowledge it relays and by the discipline its acquisition requires. Its arrogance lies in its claim to moral high ground and to the superiority of its culture, its indifference to its own stratification consequences, its conceit in its lack of relation to anything other than itself, its self-referential abstracted autonomy. The market-oriented visible pedagogy is ideologically a much more complex construction. It incorporates some of the criticism of the autonomous visible pedagogy, much of it originating from left-wing positions: criticism of the failure of the urban school, of the passivity and inferior status of parents, which combine to reduce their power over schools and teachers, of the boredom of working-class pupils and their consequent disruption of and resistance to irrelevant curricula, of assessment procedures which itemize relative failure rather than the positive strength of the acquirer. But it assimilates these criticisms into a new discourse: a new pedagogic Janus.

The explicit commitment to greater choice by parents and pupils is not a celebration of a participatory democracy but a thin cover for the old stratification of schools and curricula. New forms of assessment, profiling, criteria-referenced rather than norm-referenced assessment, allegedly to recognize and liberate individual qualities, allow of, and mark, greater control of assessment. At the same time periodic mass testing of pupils concentrates new distribution procedures for homogenizing acquisition and, at the same time, creates performance indicators of its effectiveness. Vocationalism appears to offer the lower working class a legitimation of their own pedagogic interests in a manual-based curriculum, and in so doing appears to include them as significant pedagogic subjects, yet at the same time closes off their own personal and occupational possibilities.

The situation is indeed complex. At the same time as the economy is moving towards a greater concentration upon mergers and corporate growth, at a more micro level an entrepreneurial ‘artisan’ culture is being encouraged in the service sector. This is reflected in market-oriented visible pedagogies to develop imaginary apprenticeships into the skills for this function, e.g. decorating, plumbing, carpentry for the self-employed. Even the pedagogic regimes are mixed, drawing on features of invisible pedagogy, e.g. in the ‘negotiation’ of pupils’ profiles, life skill programmes. The new pedagogic discourse recontextualizes and thus repositions within its own ideology features of apparently oppositional discourses.

The market-oriented visible pedagogy, at least in the UK, creates apparently greater local independence for, and competition between, schools and teachers, yet at the same time the schools and teachers are tied more directly to State regulation. And finally we can detect that the State is now operating on quite different principles
with respect to the principles and practices of the economy and the principles and practices of specialized agencies/agents of symbolic control, especially education. In the economy privatization rules but competition is reduced as mergers proceed apace. As the State reduces its control, corporations and multinationals take up the vacated space. In the sector of the specialized agencies of symbolic control, especially in education, we see that privatization, the local autonomies of agencies, are there to encourage greater competition between units. Indeed, we might say that the major site of competition is not the economy in total but increasingly within the sector of publicly regulated symbolic control. Yet despite the greater competition within this sector it is subject to greater and more complex forms of State regulation. Thus the essential shift which appears to be taking place is the shift of State regulation from the economy to symbolic control. Yet State management of symbolic control is accomplished more and more by the exclusion of its own agents and their replacement by managers, administrators, industrialists of the economy.

The ideological message of a market-oriented visible pedagogy is less the regulation and realization of the pedagogy of the new ‘relevance’ than the new regulation and realization of symbolic control in the transition to capitalism’s latest transformation: communications.13

Addendum

This chapter is a revision of an earlier paper, ‘Class and pedagogies: visible and invisible’ (in Class, Codes and Control, vol. 3, revised edition 1977). It develops and extends the discussion of rules and their class assumptions and provides a more general model for generating types and modalities of pedagogic practices. Further, it includes a discussion of market-oriented pedagogies and speculations on their origin, function, and linkage to macro changes in the form of symbolic control. It does not, however, replace the earlier paper but extends and builds upon it. The chapter does show that the basic underlying logic of this and other papers can deal with the question of content, as well as linking macro and micro levels of analysis.

In terms of the general classification and framing analysis, much of the focus of the chapter in the discussion of specific pedagogic practices is upon framing rather than upon classification. It should be borne in mind that principles of classification are always invisibly present in any pedagogic practice in the sense that any context of that practice presupposes a relationship with other contexts, other pedagogic practices/communications, either within the institution or external to it. Further, principles of classification are visibly present within any pedagogic practice and are realized in the arrangement of acquirers, the distribution of tasks, and in the organizational features of the context. Thus principles of classification, as principles of framing, always have internal as well as external values.

Notes

1 This chapter has benefited from seminars held at CIDE, Santiago, Chile, in 1985, and at the University of Valle, Cali, Colombia, in 1986. The present form arose out of an invitation from Adelphi University, New York, to deliver the Robert Finkelstein Annual Lecture, 1987. I am grateful to Dr Alan Sadovnik of Adelphi University for comments and discussion, and also to Celia Jenkins, of the Department of the Sociology of Education, University of London Institute of Education, whose Ph.D. thesis investigated the social class basis of progressive education in Britain.

2 For the purposes of this chapter this logic has been reduced to three rules, but there is a fourth, a recontextualizing rule which creates the content to be transmitted. […]
It is, of course, possible to have explicit hierarchical rules but degrees of implicitness of sequential/pacing rules, which indicate a weakening in the framing of these rules.

It is a matter of some interest that in the 1960s in the major disciplines of the human sciences, psychology, linguistics, and anthropology, the concept of competence underlined the structuralist theories of Piaget (child development), Chomsky (linguistics), and Lévi-Strauss (anthropology). Competence in all three theories refers to an in-built grammar. Chomsky’s theory of syntax, Piaget’s theory of the development and transformation of cognitive operations, Lévi-Strauss’s theory of cultural assemblies and reassemblies are all competences triggered by interaction with non-culturally specific others. That is, competence arises out of two facilities, an in-built facility and an interactional facility. From this point of view competence-acquisition takes place, analytically speaking, at the level of the social, not the cultural, because acquisition is dependent not upon any cultural arrangement but upon social interaction.

Competence theories, then, integrate the biological with the social, but both are disconnected from the cultural. Competence theories point to competence-acquisition as entailing active participation on the part of the acquirer. Indeed, competence-acquisition arises out of the creative possibilities of the acquirer in inferring rules (Chomsky) in the process of accommodation (Piaget) in bricolage (Levi-Strauss). In a sense competence theories announce a fundamental democracy: all are equal in their acquisition, all actively participate in their acquisition, creativity is intrinsic to becoming social. Differences between individuals are then a product of culture. From this point of view competence theories may be regarded as critiques showing the disparity between what we are and what we become, between what we are capable of and our performance. However, this idealism is bought at a price: the price of severing the relation between power, culture, and competence, between meanings and the structures through which meanings become possible. The democracy of competence theories is a democracy removed from society.

An analysis of symbolic control, its agents, agencies, and its relation to the economic field may be found in Bernstein (1986). . . For empirical study of differences in the socialization of adolescents whose parents function in the field of symbolic control and the economic field see Holland (1986), Aggleton and Whitty (1985), and Cohen (1981).

It is important to point out that what we have called ‘lexical’ and ‘syntactic’ pedagogic practices are within the general thesis that the privileging code of the school is elaborated. We may now be finding that this code is officially suspended and replaced by a ‘lexical’ pedagogic practice relaying less the exploration of principles than context-specific operations which develop low-level skills. In the past, the suspension of an elaborated code with respect to groups of pupils, usually lower working-class, including racially disadvantaged groups, was not official policy but came about because of the context that teachers and pupils alike found themselves in.

King (1978 and elsewhere) criticizes the analysis of invisible pedagogy on the grounds that his empirical study of primary schools found no evidence of its existence. As has been pointed out here and in the original paper it is more likely that what will be found is an embedded pedagogic practice, the invisible embedded in the visible. The pure form is more likely to be found in the private sector. Invisible pedagogy was institutionalized under the name of dialog-pedagogike in Sweden in the 1970s. Empirical support for the practice of invisible pedagogy in middle-class families may be found in the references cited in note 5, and at the level of the classroom in Daniels (1988, 1989). An enquiry into different forms of special school organization, pedagogic practice, and pupil discrimination is to be found in CORE 12, 2. See also Jenkins (1989).

‘Autonomous’ in the sense of independent is clearly relative to ‘market-oriented’ in the sense of dependent upon economy. Certainly in the United Kingdom (and, for that matter, elsewhere) all levels of the educational systems have for the past thirty years become more and more subject to central control. University research funding is now severely constrained both by the reduction in governmental funding (especially in the social sciences) and by governmental criteria regulating approved research.
Market-oriented visible pedagogies indicate a shift of focus of central government, both with respect to the knowledge which is transmitted and with respect to the change in the controlling agents, which now include industrialists. This shift of focus involves not only the development of specialized curricula but also the development of specialized schools.

10 I am indebted to Patricia Broadfoot (1986) for these points.

11 The discussion of invisible pedagogies has occurred in a context where such a practice is dominant within the institution (e.g. family, primary school, pre-school). It has been noted that an invisible pedagogy is less likely to appear in a pure form in the public sector but more likely to be embedded in a visible pedagogy. However, it is possible that features of invisible pedagogy will be found as specialized practices within a predominantly visible pedagogy modality. Here such a specialized practice is likely to be particular to a part of the curriculum (e.g. life skills), addressed to a particular social group (e.g. disadvantaged class or ethnic groups), or may even form part of an assessment procedure. In general invisible pedagogies and/or ‘integrated’ pedagogic practices are more likely to be formed at primary level or, if at secondary level, associated with disadvantaged social groups as means of their social control. In general, shifts towards invisible pedagogies or similar ‘progressive’ practices which imply a weakening of classification and framing are more likely to occur in times of ‘economic buoyancy’. Such practices are more expensive, both with respect to the training of the transmitters and with respect to the cost of the transmission, than visible pedagogies. In times of economic boom/growth the demand side is less powerful than the supply side, and as a consequence hierarchies may well take a more indirect, less explicit form as well as being less able to be as selective with respect to ideas, personnel, and interests. However, in times of slump and chronic unemployment demand is more powerful than supply, hierarchies may be expected to become more explicit and directive, more selective of ideas, personnel, and interests. As a consequence, in general, classification and framing relations are likely to strengthen in conjunction with stronger central control. However, as pointed out earlier, specialized invisible pedagogic practices are still likely to be inserted as devices of social control.

In summary we could hypothesize that shifts in modal state pedagogic practices away from, or towards, weak classification and weak framing (‘progressive’ practices) are likely to be mediated by shifts in the economy which change the social basis of the influencing dominant agents of the state, the degree of explicitness of hierarchies, and the terms of supply of and demand for pedagogic practitioners. In the case of development/expansion of the economy, there is likely to be an increase in public expenditure on education, medical, and social services, and influencing dominant agents are likely to be drawn from agents of symbolic control specializing in agencies of symbolic control, whereas in the case of a downturn in the economy there is likely to be a reduction in public expenditure on education, medical, and social services, and influencing dominant agents of the state are likely to be drawn not from symbolic control but from the economic field.

12 Whilst it can be hypothesized that the more abstract the principles of the forces of division of labour then the more simple its social division of labour, because many of the lower (and increasingly the higher) functions are in information chains and feedback loops of the computer, it is also likely that, as the social division of labour of the economic field becomes both simplified and reduced, that of the field of symbolic control is likely to increase in complexity and size. Further, there is likely to be an attempt to develop an entrepreneurial service structure of the artisan type. Much of the vocational training of sections of the working class is directed towards this end.

13 The transition is linked to high levels of unemployment, changes in occupational functions and conditions, an increase in mergers, recurrent dangers of severe recession, which together may produce instabilities in the social order. The overall movement to greater state control in the field of symbolic control often announces itself through an ideology of the family and nation. This new individualism regulating the field of symbolic control contrasts sharply with the corporative potential of the communications revolution in the economic field.
References


