Logical Connectives of Imperative Logic: Formulated by Peter. B. M. Vranas

Abstract

Since the twentieth century the logic of imperatives has become a topic of serious study for the logicians and philosophers. The necessity and usefulness of imperative logic lies in the fact that we make imperative inferences in our day-to-day life. Imperative arguments have imperative sentences either as their premises or as their conclusions or as both. Imperative arguments are more than a possibility and can be determined as valid or invalid. But there is a problem in developing the logic for imperative sentences is that imperative sentences are non-descriptive in nature and are neither true nor false. Hence it is not possible to accommodate the non-descriptive sentences like imperative within the domain of classical two valued logic. For this reason, logicians undertake an effort to formulate a logical system for imperative sentences. As a result imperative logic emerges in parallel to classical two-valued logic. But there are two trends admitted regarding the logic of imperative sentences - reductionism and non-reductionism. Reductionism upholds that imperative sentences are reducible to declarative sentences. Non-reductionism holds that a logical system for imperative sentences is to be articulated in parallel to classical two valued logic as imperative sentences having their own distinctive features cannot be reduced to declarative ones. Peter. B. M. Vranas has propounded a full-fledged logical system of imperative logic which deals with different kinds of imperative arguments, its non-truth functional connectives and validity. This paper aims to discuss the logical connectives of his system along with some comments.